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RECENT DECISIONS
TAXATION - EXEMPTIONS - CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS -
ASSESSMENTS OR TAxEs.-Relator is a charitable corporation within
the purview of Section 4, subdivision 6, of the New York Tax Law
which exempts such an institution from payment of taxes on its real
property. The defendant, tax assessor for the Town of Greenburgh,
has levied annual assessments on the real property owned by relator
for its share of cost and construction of a water district, an ash and
garbage disposal district, a fire district and a sewer district. Relator
claimed that these charges were illegally imposed because they were
taxes and that the relator is a tax exempt institution under the statute.
The defendant insisted that the charges were not taxes but "special
assessments" from which no one is exempt. Held, judgment for de-
fendant affirmed. The charges levied were not taxes. They were
special assessments and ".... by subdivision 6 of section 4 of the Tax
Law the Legislature intended to exempt the relator from such taxa-
tion as it would, but for the exemption, have to share for govern-
mental purposes with all other persons in a village or city or the
State, and that it was not intended to exempt the relator from assess-
ments made for the expense to its property' and to impose the whole
of such expenses upon other property or upon the public generally." 2
People ex rel. Neu, York School for Deaf v. Townsend, 298 N. Y.
645, N. E. 2d (1948) .3
In analyzing the soundness of this decision one must rely upon
the rather short opinion of the Official Referee for the Supreme Court
in Westchester County because the affirmance of the Appellate Divi-
sion and of the Court of Appeals were reported as memorandum de-
cisions and contain no statement or analysis of the bases of their con-
clusions. For the statement quoted in the above paragraph the lower
court relied upon two cases, Roosevelt Hospital v. Mayor 4 and Nuns
of Order St. Dominic v. Town of Huntington.5  The Roosevelt
Hospital case would seem to be poor authority upon which to base a
decision construing the legislative intent behind Section 4(6) of the
Tax Law. That case was decided in 1881 before the exemption
I See Board of Education v. Town of Greenburgh, 277 N. Y. 193, 195,
13 N. E. 2d 768 (1938), wherein the court said: "By section 153 of the
Education Law... it [the legislature] has provided that 'the grounds, buildings
. of a school district shall not be subject to taxation for any purpose.
Such a general exemption does not relieve plaintiff's property from taxation
imposed for local improvements by which special benefits are received. It has
been held in cases involving analogous situations that such an exemption ap-
plies only to taxation imposed by general law and does not relieve real property
from its just share of the burden imposed for local benefits [citing cases]:'(Italics ours.)
2 173 Misc. 908, 18 N. Y. S. 2d at 8.
3 This was a memorandum decision affirming 261 App. Div. 841, 25 N. Y. S.
2d 1002 (2d Dep't 1941) (memorandum decision), affirming 173 Misc. 906,
18 N. Y. S. 2d 865 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
484 N. Y. 108 (1881).
G268 N. Y. 580, 198 N. E. 413 (1935).
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statute had been enacted in New York. There, the act incorporating
the charitable institution exempted its real estate from taxation but
the court nevertheless held that such real estate was not thereby
exempt from an assessment for a local improvement.6 It is difficult
to envision this decision as illuminating the legislative intent behind
the section mentioned when that provision had not as yet been en-
acted and when the case actually involved the construction of a private
statute. In the Town of Huntington case the Court of Appeals af-
firmed a judgment of the lower courts holding that the property of
the charitable institution was not exempt from taxes levied for its
share of interest on bonds issued by a water district, the proceeds of
which were used to construct a water plant and water main system.
This holding, although lending support to the Townsend decision
would seem to be weak authority because of the absence of any opin-
ion by either the lower courts or the Court of Appeals. The bases
of the courts' conclusions must remain unknown and any decision
which conjecturely implies these bases must stand on a shaky
foundation.
The relator in the Townsend case relied upon an early opinion
of the Attorney General 7 to support his contention that the charges
complained of were taxes and not special assessments. That opinion
involved a statute 8 providing that the charge for a lighting district
was to be levied and collected within the district in the same manner
and at the same time and by the same officers as the town tax. The
Attorney General held that by reason of this procedure of assessment
and collection, the charges were taxes and not special assessments
and that the charitable institution was exempt from payment under
Section 4(6). It should be here noted that in the Townsend case
the charges for the ash and garbage disposal district, the fire district
and the water district were all to be levied, assessed and collected
in the same manner and by the same officers as the town taxes and
there was no provision that the assessments be made in proportion
to benefits received. As for the sewer district charge, the assessment
was to be levied according to benefits received. It is evident, there-
fore, that the first three charges mentioned fall directly within the
language and purview of the 1915 Attorney General's opinion and
that by his decision they should be considered taxes, thereby exempt-
ing the relator from payment.
In a later Opinion of the Attorney General, 9 rendered since the
lower court decision in the Townsend case, it is indicated that the
6The local improvement in the Roosevelt case was a sewer system. See
also Matter of Dinn v. Board of Education, 121 Misc. 633, 202 N. Y. Supp. 62
(Sup. Ct. 1923) (exemption does not apply to an assessment for local im-
provement such as a sewer).
72 Ops. Arr'Y GEN. 44 (1915).
8N. Y. TOWN LAW § 263.
9 Ors. Airr'y GEN. 386 (1943), 1944 LEG. Doc. No. 29.
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tax assessors have relied upon the earlier opinion as authority since
1915 and that they have proceeded to exempt such charges as taxes.
After discussing the earlier opinion, .the Townsend case and several
related cases, the Attorney General has indicated the present state
of affairs on this point as follows: 10 "Under these decisions, the dis-
tinction to be observed is between taxes levied for the ordinary sup-
port of government and those taxes or assessments which are levied
in special districts to cover the expense of improvements which are
specifically beneficial to property. The latter, under the law now
existing, appear to include not only those levies that are commonly
termed special assessments for local improvements, i.e., assessments
that are charged upon the properties in proportion to the benefits
received, but also levies upon properties in special districts that are
in fact for local improvements even though they are levied, like ordi-
nary taxes, in accordance with the assessed valuations of the
properties.
"In response to your specific inquiry, you are advised that the
effect of the decisions in the Townsend and Town of Huntington
cases is to overrule the 1915 opinion of the Attorney-General men-
tioned above."
From the preceding group of cases we have seen that, vague and
unsatisfactory as they are, they have at least been consistent to the
extent that invariably the courts have avoided permitting exemptions.
In each case their decision was predicated on the "inherent" differ-
ence between taxes levied for the general support of government and
assessments for local improvements. The origin of the distinction is
fairly vague and is not founded upon statute. Unfortunately it is
now a deeply rooted judicial precedent. It would be difficult to find
another series of cases which so enthusiastically beg the fundamental
question involved and rely instead upon a superficial distinction of
nomenclature. Possibly the courts have been misled to their conclu-
sion because if one does ignore (as have the courts) the paramount
reasons for exempting charitable institutions from taxation it does
seem eminently fair to assess local property for local improvements.
Had they come to grips with the basic reason for the charitable ex-
emptions and found in these assessment cases the reason wanting,
there could then be little cause to complain. Instead we find them
guilty of three fundamental errors which we will first enumerate and
then discuss in detail. They are: (1) begging the question of legis-
lative intent by assuming that intent to be exemption from taxes but
not from assessments; (2) creating differentiations and distinctions
without adequately justifying them; and (3) avoiding opinions and
contenting themselves with inadequate memoranda. The two last are
complementary.
10 Id. at 387.
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The Townsend case contained a prime example of what we mean
by begging the question of legislative intent. Consider again this
statement: "It seems clear enough that by subdivision 6 of section 4
of the Tax Law the Legislature intended to exempt the relator from
such taxation as it would, but for the exemption, have to share for
governmental purposes with all other persons in a village or city or
the State, and that it was not intended to exempt the relator from
assessments made for the expense of improvements specifically bene-
ficial to its property and to impose the whole of such expense upon
other property or upon the public generally. This was the language
used in the opinion of Roosevelt Hospital v. Mayor .... ,11 Aside
from the fact that the Roosevelt case preceded the passage of the
exemption statute by several years, it is difficult to see how this
statement can be justified by a reading of subdivision 6 of Section 4
of the Tax Law or by a consideration of the factors which prompted
its passage. This statute says simply: "The following property
shall be exempt from taxation .... 6. The real property of a cor-
poration or association organized exclusively for the moral or mental
improvement of men and women or for religious . . . charitable ...
and used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or more of such
purposes." Further along in the act there is included the require-
ment that there be no profit making but nowhere is there to be found
any enumerated types of tax which are specifically exempt. Thus in
construing this statute we are aided by the general rule that enu-
meratio4 weakens the purview of the statute'and that lack of enu-
meration indicates complete general application. Applying this test
we are left with a blanket exemption of all taxes, whether for some
convenient purposes they are denominated "special assessments" or
not.
There are many cases to be found to the general effect that ex-
emptions are not favored and are to be strictly construed; that the
exemption must be expressed in clear and unambiguous language,
and within the intention of the legislature.1 2 Subdivision 6 of Sec-
tion 4 is clear and unambiguous on its face and its general exemption
should be strictly construed to the effect that since it grants a general
exemption, this exemption should not be whittled away by judicial
surgery.' 3 This legal argument becomes even more potent when we
11 See note 2 supra.
12 People v. Cameron, 140 App. Div. 76, 124 N. Y. Supp. 949 (3d Dep't
1910), aff'd, 200 N. Y. 585, 94 N. E. 1097 (1911); People v. Purdy, 179 App.
Div. 805, 167 N. Y. Supp. 285 (1st Dep't 1917), aff'd, 224 N. Y. 710, 121
N. E. 885 (1918); Matter of Francis, 121 App. Div. 129, 105 N. Y. S:pp.
643 (4th Dep't 1907), affd, 189 N. Y. 554, 82 N. E. 1126 (1907).
13 The rule requiring strict construction of exemptions from taxation must
be applied in light of purposes to be furthered by the exemptions granted,
and if evidence shows use of property to be in furtherance of purposes en-
couraged and fostered by exemption, an overzealous adherence to strict con-
struction should not be indulged so as to thwart such purposes. New York
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consider it in relation to the political and social significance of char-
itable exemptions.
There can be little doubt that our social order has now reached
a stage of development where our institutions of education, medicine,
and religion have become a vitally necessary part of our society.
There also can be little doubt that at present a large percentage of
these services are rendered by charitable institutions completely inde-
pendent of direct governmental aid. There also can be little doubt
that if these services were not rendered by these institutions the
Government would be compelled to perform the services itself at
enormous cost.1 4 With this thought in mind and with no thought
of benevolence but rather only of self service the state established
tax exemptions for charitable institutions. This policy was so clear
that in order to avoid it the courts had to justify their decisions by
creating a type of taxation known as special assessment. They fur-
ther rationalized their distinction by pointing out that the special
assessments were levied only for direct benefit to the institutions in-
volved. They failed to perceive that money not paid by institutions
for general government is just as useful to them in furthering their
purposes as money not paid by them for local street improvements.
Only one possible argument refuting this rationale presents it-
self but upon careful examination, it, when weighed against the wis-
dom of the contrary view, does not loom very weightily. Local
assessments are collected upon a circumscribed basis depending upon
the nature and extent of the improvement. It is possible to imagine
a situation wherein the charitable institution's holdings are so large
and the remaining holdings in a district subject to the assessment
are so small that it would be a great burden on the non-exempt
taxpayers. But the situation is not likely. What is likely and does
occur frequently is the reverse of our hypothesis. Instances are not
rare in which we find that the assessment upon the institution is a
formidable one whereas the same assessment spread over the remain-
ing taxpayers would be negligible. The hardships of the first case
can easily be solved without resorting to methods which further finan-
cially embarrass charitable institutions, many of which are habitually
on the brink of insolvency.
In any event to so drastically depart from the apparent legis-
lative pattern, the courts certainly should have done so by well con-
sidered opinions which fully support the point. So chary have they
been of reason one almost suspects that they lack reasons. As pointed
Catholic Protectory v. City of New York, 175 Misc. 427, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 789
(Sup. Ct. 1940); St. Barbara's Roman Catholic Church v. City of New
York, 243 App. Div. 371, 277 N. Y. Supp. 538 (2d Dep't 1935).
14 With our American concept of separation of Church and State the social
uses of religion as linked with education and medicine might be debated. But
even in the absence of all religion the State would still have to find a sub-
stitute for religion's undoubted contribution to social discipline and morality.
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out earlier the Townsend case relied upon two cases for its authority,
one containing no opinion and the other, although it had an opinion,
antedated the passage of subdivision 6 of Section 4 of the Tax Law.
This latter case while pivoting upon the interpretation of a private
statute incorporating the hospital, did establish clearly the distinction
between taxes and special assessments.' 5 However, it limited the
distinction to what would clearly be special purpose assessments. A
fair reading of the case would never support the Townsend decision
in so far as it validated special assessments which, while for a local
improvement, were collected as general taxes and not apportioned
directly to the benefit received.
In conclusion it is recommended that a new evaluation and dec-
laration of policy be made upon this problem. For the first time the
purpose of the legislature should be fully and openly considered with
respect to the entire purpose of charitable exemptions because at
present it is1iot at all clear that the legislature did not intend a full
exemption.
The entire line of decisions should also be reconsidered towards
the purpose of more clearly categorizing them since many of them
can be distinguished. For example public school district cases should
not be lumped with charitable institutions since they are tax supported
anyway and the problems of both are leagues apart. Secondly, ex-
emptions sought under specific statutes should not be confused with
exemptions sought under the general tax exemption of Section 4 of
the Tax Law. Finally and above all, a definite answer must be made
to the question, is the burden of the special assessment to be levied
in direct proportion to the benefit received. In considering this last,
further clarification must be made as to the method of collection.and
the remoteness as to time of the possible benefit.
H. V. M.
A. P. D.
TAXATION-FAMILY PARTNERSIP.-Respondent, a rancher in
Texas, sold an undivided one-half interest in a herd of cattle to his
four sons taking their promissory notes therefor. A family partner-
ship was formed by the father and his sons, and the boys repaid the
note from their share of the partnership profits. The Commissioner
of Internal Revenue ruled that the entire income from the partner-
ship must be taxed to respondent. The Tax Court sustained the
Commissioner on the grounds that the taxpayer had not satisfied the
requirements for recognition of family partnerships set out by the
United States Supreme Court in the Tower 1 and Lusthaus 2 cases.
15 Roosevelt Hospital v. Mayor, note 4 supra.
1 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280 (1946).
2 Lusthaus v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 327 U. S.' 293 (1946).
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